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Romantic Rebirth in a Secular Age: Cavell's Aversive Exertions* 
Richard Eldridge / Swarthmore College 
"For by thy words," Matthew writes, in a passage Stanley Cavell has 
taken as an epigraph to part 3 of his The Claim of Reason,' "thou shalt be 
justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned." It is possible to hear 
in this passage the central themes concerning individuality, community, 
and the meaning of life that have shaped Cavell's writing throughout his 
career and that have become even more marked in his recent work. It is 
by thy words that one will be judged: individuality is something that per- 
sons must claim (or refuse) in their expressions if they are to live humanly 
and well; it is a task involving the achievement of a voice, not a possession. 
But it is by thy words that one must manage this achievement: genuine 
individuality can be won only through engagement with our common 
inheritances, not through separation or detachment, intellectual or other- 
wise; philosophy, and the individuality it would support, must speak from 
within our common life and language, not from a place apart. It is further 
by thy words that one shall be both justified and condemned: there are no 
perfect exemplars of individuality and humanity; our best achieve- 
ments-our actions and relations and utterances that are most worthy of 
justification-will at the same time be marked by self-assertiveness, pride, 
and rejections of the common that will call for condemnation. Both justifi- 
cation and condemnation will then be forthcoming from the very words 
that call for them, as both our individuality and our pridefulness will be 
legible in what we have said and done: by thy words shall one be submitted 
to judgment. 
The task of philosophy, in Cavell's practice, is to animate the "thy," to 
call us out of complacency and inexpressiveness in our ordinary routines 
and into individuality and humanity. Carrying out this task involves over- 
coming our attachments to the false necessities of our routines in favor of 
the deeper necessity that our humanity express itself. Cavell's views of the 
ordinary and of philosophy "respond to the fantastic in what human 
beings will accustom themselves to, call this the surrealism of the 
habitual-as if to be human is forever to be prey to turning your corner of 
the human race, hence perhaps all of it, into some new species of the genus 
of humanity, for the better or for the worst. I might describe my philo- 
* Stanley Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago: Univer- 
sity of Chicago Press, 1988), xiii+200 pp. 
' Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1979). 
o 1991 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-4189/91/7103-0007$01.00 
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sophical task as one of outlining the necessity, and the lack of necessity, in 
the sense of the human as inherently strange, say unstable, its quotidian as 
forever fantastic" (p. 154). Here our humanity as it is expressed in ordi- 
nary practice is both the occasioning object of philosophy, when that 
expression is partial or blocked or distorted, and the aim of philosophy, 
which seeks humanity's fuller or more adequate expression. The domi- 
nant image in Cavell's writing of the refiguring or realigning of the inter- 
relations of our nature and our practice is that of rebirth. "The rhetoric of 
humanity as a form of life, or a level of life, standing in need of something 
like transfiguration-some radical change, but as it were from inside, not 
by anything; some say in another birth, symbolizing a different order of 
natural reactions-is typical of a line of apparently contradictory sensibili- 
ties, ones that may appear as radically innovative (in action or in feeling) 
or radically conservative: Luther was such a sensibility; so were Rousseau 
and Thoreau."2 And Cavell is himself such a sensibility. His writing 
increasingly has the ring of prophecy, as he casts the necessity of a sense of 
the strangeness of the human and of the uncanniness of its given routines 
as a form of awareness of genuine possibilities of rebirth, while the lack of 
this necessity is cast as a form of cowardice or of repression. To refuse this 
necessity is to bedim or betray one's humanity by failing to realize that it 
has no proper resting place in practice as it either stands or might stand. It 
is hence no accident that Cavell has recently insisted on distinguishing 
what he does from what ordinarily and naturally goes in a university, 
which "is set up to be exactly what the sciences require, say the organized 
advancement and transmission of knowledge." Philosophy, the continu- 
ing effort to reanimate the human against the grain of practice as it 
momentarily stands, "raises questions which may be out of order in a class- 
room so conceived." It involves taking seriously midnight thoughts about 
alienation, meaningfulness, distance, and attunement that do not admit of 
domestication into a guiding and teachable doctrine of life, which at best 
could only hold in place a new form of practice with its own inhibitions of 
expressiveness. The activity of envisioning and articulating possibilities of 
rebirth into greater expressiveness admits of no resting place. 
Yet, for all that Cavell's philosophical writing takes its departure from 
the criticism of practice as it stands, there is no effort to leave daily prac- 
tice behind, to achieve transcendence of the ordinary, or to live in a realm 
of the intellect or the divine. Cavell now regularly praises "Emerson and 
2 Stanley Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America (Albuquerque, N.M.: Living Batch, 
1989), p. 44. It is instructive to note the persistent appearance in Cavell's writing of lists of sensi- 
bilities heroically reactive against the deadened donventions of their ages. See, e.g., the similar 
lists in The Claim of Reason (pp. 109, 121, 125) and in In Quest of the Ordinary (p. 9). 
SStanley Cavell, "An Interview with Stanley Cavell," conducted by James Conant, in The Senses 
ofStanley Cavell, ed. Richard Fleming and Michael Payne, Bucknell Review 32, no. 1 (1989): 70. 
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Thoreau in their devotion to the thing they call the common, the familiar, 
the near, the low" (p. 4). Whatever transfigurations and rebirths there are 
to be are to have more the nature of revisionings of ourselves in relation to 
our practices than either of revolutions or escapes or of reforms that leave 
our conceptions of our interests untouched.4 There is no special domain, 
there are no third entities outside our common life, from which philoso- 
phy might begin and to which it might lead us: forms, substances, atoms, 
and logic are all impotent to play these roles. Nor is there any special class 
of persons, distinguished by their cleverness or learning, properly to be 
called philosophers. Cavell has learned fromJ. L. Austin's patient interro- 
gations and elucidations of ordinary usage and from Wittgenstein's con- 
cern to keep language from going on philosophical holiday to contest the 
Platonic conceit that "there is, or ought to be ... a special class of persons 
to be called philosophers, who possess and are elevated by a special class or 
degree of knowledge" (p. 161). 
Here we can see in Cavell the rejection of scientism and of claims to 
expertise in philosophy that are typical of Rorty, Lyotard, and other 
recent postmodernist writers much influenced by Wittgenstein and 
Dewey but without the Humean domestications of our critical ambitions 
that are distinctive of these postmodernist figures. Though philosophy 
cannot escape the ordinary or criticize it from without, neither is it to be 
reduced to mere relaxed chat or to appreciative exchanges of a thousand 
points of view, no one of which can engage our passions fully. The differ- 
ence here is that, for Cavell, unlike Rorty and other postmodernist, prag- 
matist, domesticating sensibilities, the ordinary is itself fantastic, uncanny, 
or divided against itself, filled with both expressions and repressions of 
independence and solidarity, ambition and resignation, hope and despair. 
Hence Cavell's recent interest in Poe's flat, prosaic, naturalistic 
registerings of protagonists' experiences of the extraordinary doubleness 
of ordinary things, as in "The Black Cat": 
For the most wild, yet almost homely narrative which I am about the pen, I nei- 
ther expect nor solicit belief. Mad indeed would I be to expect it, in a case where 
my very senses reject their own evidence. Yet, mad am I not-and very surely I 
do not dream. But to-morrow I die, and today I would unburden my soul. My 
immediate purpose is to place before the world, plainly, succinctly, and without 
comment, a series of mere household events. In their consequences, these events 
have terrified-have tortured-have destroyed me. Yet I will not attempt to 
expound them. [Cited in Cavell, p. 122] 
Juxtaposed with the opening paragraphs of Descartes's Meditations, this 
passage works "to bring out at once Poe's brilliance (and what is more, his 
4 See Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America, p. 44. 
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argumentative soundness) and Descartes's creepy, perverse calm (given 
the subjects his light of reason rakes across), his air of a mad diarist" (p. 
122). The juxtaposition illustrates, that is, the thought that "the uncanny 
vision [is] essential to philosophy-to the extent that philosophy is what 
attacks false necessities and false ideas of the necessary" (p. 184) and the 
further thought that the ordinary itself provides the resources and occa- 
sions for this vision. 
This emphasis on the uncanniness of the ordinary as the continuing 
inspiration of philosophy is a considerable surpassing and deepening of 
Cavell's earlier work on skepticism in philosophy. (The essay "The 
Uncanniness of the Ordinary" [pp. 153-78] is the finest overview of his 
concerns that Cavell has produced to date.) "Skepticism" now emerges as 
the name within philosophy for the nearly primordial experience of the 
uncanny or perhaps of what the uncanny itself names: the way in which 
our ordinary practices, no matter what their shape, variously but inevita- 
bly support and inhibit our humanity and expressiveness. Modern philo- 
sophical skepticism captures or expresses this uncanniness. "For me the 
uncanniness of the ordinary is epitomized by the possibility or the threat 
of what philosophy has called skepticism, understood ... as the capacity, 
even desire, of ordinary language to repudiate itself" (p. 154). Hence 
modern, post-Cartesian philosophical skepticism is neither the misbegot- 
ten and surpassable intellectual by-product of modern science that Rorty 
takes it to be nor quite a self-subsisting intellectual problem that is to be 
met with a solution or a demonstration of our knowledge. Rather "mod- 
ern skepticism [is] philosophy's expression or interpretation of the thing 
known to literature (among other places) in melodrama and in trag- 
edy ... : roughly, the dependence of the human self on society for its defi- 
nition, but at the same time its transcendence of that definition, its infinite 
insecurity in maintaining its existence" (p. 174).5 This dependence and 
transcendence are continually there to be experienced, and such experi- 
ences must be continually worked through in the work of writing, not 
repressed or dismissed, as we live out our humanity. 
The continuing, ineliminable presence of these conditions as occasion- 
ing circumstances of both philosophy in general and Cavell's writing in 
particular accounts for what might be called the characteristic Romantic 
aversiveness of Cavell's writing: its refusal to settle on a formula or doc- 
trine of practical wisdom or of human nature as well as its continual 
rebukes to both our sensibilities, perhaps deadened as they stand, and 
5 For a fuller elaboration of Cavell's interpretation of skepticism as an expression of an 
ineliminable experience of imperfections of alignment of self and society, see Richard Eldridge, 
"'A Continuing Task': Cavell and the Truth of Skepticism," in Fleming and Payne, eds., Bucknell 
Review 32, no. 1 (1989): 73-89. 
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Cavell's own sensibility, threatened with decay or atrophy. This 
aversiveness-to doctrine, to us, and to itself-lends to Cavell's writing a 
combination of apocalyptic audacity, as we are criticized where we are, 
and strangeness, as we remain uncertain about where to go.6 Aversive 
Romantic writing attempts to mark out a continuing path of experience 
and life between existentialist anxiety, with its halting collapses, and 
sober, scientistic metaphysics, with its inhuman sureties and consecrations 
of particular forms of practice. This writing seeks not accumulation, not 
bits of knowledge, not information, but onwardness, rebirth, awakening. 
Compare Wordsworth-"... Paradise, and groves / Elysian, Fortunate 
Fields-like those of old / Sought in the Atlantic Main-why should they 
be / A history only of departed things, Or a mere fiction of what never 
was? ... and by words / Which speak of nothing more than what we are, / 
Would I arouse the sensual from their sleep / Of Death, and win the 
vacant and the vain / To noble raptures . . ."7-with Cavell: 
It is [my] history of devotion to the discovery of false necessity that brought me 
to the ambiguity of the title I give to these lectures, In Quest of the Ordinary; to the 
sense that the ordinary is subject at once to autopsy and to augury, facing at once 
its end and its anticipation. The everyday is ordinary because, after all, it is our 
habit, or habitat; but since that very inhabitation is from time to time perceptible 
to us-we who have constructed it-as extraordinary, we conceive that some 
place elsewhere, or this place otherwise constructed, must be what is ordinary to 
us, must be what romantics-of course including both E. T. and Nicholas 
Nickelby's alter ego Smike-call "home." ... Romantics are brave in noting the 
possibility of life-in-death and of what you might call death-in-life. My favorite 
Romantics are the ones (I think the bravest ones) who do not attempt to escape 
these conditions by taking revenge on existence. But this means willing to con- 
tinue to be born, to be natal, hence mortal. [Pp. 9, 143] 
In In Quest of the Ordinary Cavell himself has become further aware of 
how his writing, and its ambitions run alongside the writings and ambi- 
tions of central figures in the history of Romanticism. The projects of 
Wordsworth, in the "Preface" to Lyrical Ballads (p. 6), Coleridge, in both 
"The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" and Biographia Literaria (pp. 56, 57), 
6 M. H. Abrams has recently cited A. C. Bradley on the audacity and strangeness of 
Wordsworth's writing and thought: "A. C. Bradley, in an essay on Wordsworth written eighty 
years ago, noted how 'audacious' and 'strange' some of his poems are. 'The road into 
Wordsworth's mind,' Bradley advised us, 'must be through his strangeness and his paradoxes, not 
round them"' ("The Strangeness of Wordsworth," New York Review of Books 36, no. 20 [December 
21, 1989]: 46). The classic source on Wordsworth's strange adversiveness and homelessness is 
Geoffrey H. Hartman's Wordsworth's Poetry, 1787-1814, rev. ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni- 
versity Press, 1971). See also Kenneth R. Johnston, Wordsworth and "The Recluse" (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984). 
SWilliam Wordsworth, "Prospectus to The Recluse," in Selected Poems and Prefaces, ed. Jack 
Stillinger (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 46, lines 800-804, 811-15. 
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Emerson, in various essays, chiefly "Experience," "Self-Reliance," and 
"The American Scholar" (pp. 35, 106, 108), Thoreau, in Walden (pp. 
171-72, 183), and Poe, in "The Black Cat" and "The Imp of the Per- 
verse" (p. 141), are all described in terms that echo Cavell's characteriza- 
tions of his own project: making the ordinary interesting, or succumbing 
to the temptation to surpass the conventional and exemplifying the diffi- 
culty of the return, or making us upright and unapologetic, or "the find- 
ing of ecstasy in the knowledge of loss" (p. 171), or raising "the question as 
to the existence of myself, or creation of myself" (p. 141). This writing 
seeks always "not a state of being, but a moment of change, say of becom- 
ing" (p. 111). 
The aversiveness and the seeking of becoming in Cavell's writing both 
mark a central difference between it and deconstruction, which likewise 
but differently casts traditional philosophical texts as writerly effects of 
particular experiences. For Cavell, unlike deconstruction, such relation 
to traditional philosophical texts as there can and ought to be is not that 
of dismissal and not an effect of theory. Deconstruction seems still too 
somber and metaphysical, too obsessed with a governing metaphysics of 
writing and of philosophy, than does Cavell's concern with particular 
texts. Cavell himself notes this difference (p. 132). It is perhaps an inheri- 
tance on the part of deconstruction from Heidegger, who also, despite all 
his centrality in Cavell's thought, strikes Cavell as soberly metaphysical 
and as claiming his own exemption from what he would criticize (p. 159). 
Where deconstruction emphasizes the origin of philosophy in will to 
power and its ultimate failure, Cavell emphasizes its origin in the primor- 
dial midnight (or midafternoon) experience of the uncanny, and he 
focuses on particular scenes in texts of partial instruction in, transmission 
of, reaction to, and rebirth in culture, rather than on the failure of philos- 
ophy (p. 131). (These are matters of tone and of Cavell's Americaness 
that are central to placing his project but hard to argue out apart from a 
feel for the textures of what Cavell and Derrida, and his epigones, are 
variously up to.) 
The continuing aversiveness of Cavell's writing, of philosophy itself as 
Cavell sees it, immediately raises the question of what kind of return or 
recovery from the experience of the uncanny and from philosophy is pos- 
sible. There is clearly no going back to the experience of the world one 
might imagine oneself to have had before the experience of the uncanny, 
no return to an undisturbed consciousness. One will continue to experi- 
ence the world as uncanny, continue to be aware of one's simultaneous 
dependence on and transcendence of others, for the uncanny itself names 
the experience of the return of familiarity, where awareness of the return 
continues to mark the world that is returned. "The return of what we 
accept as the world will then present itself as a return of the familiar, 
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which is to say, exactly under the concept of what Freud names the 
uncanny" (p. 166). One will not be able to master the world 
metaphysically and to navigate one's way in it through reliance on the 
sureties of a theory of what is presented to us in objects or in others. At 
best to be returned from the crippling and alienating experience of the 
uncanny and to a rebirth in a world of continuing uncanniness will involve 
coming to be able to "relate concealment and revelation, or say repression 
and power" (p. 168). Acquiring this ability may require in certain ways the 
assistance or the shunning of others, the refiguration of one's relations. 
Persisting in this acquisition is less an object of knowledge than of anxiety 
and of hope. When, following Emerson, we acknowledge this anxiety and 
express this hope of continuing return or rebirth, then our "words have 
the rhetoric of a bargain or a prayer, as in 'Give us this day our daily 
bread'; it is not something to take for granted" (p. 171). 
Following Cavell in his efforts at rebirth and through his aversiveness 
has curious effects utterly unlike those of what is usually classed as normal, 
professional philosophical writing. Cavell's writing can strike one, in its 
aversiveness, sometimes as unserious, writerly posturing and sometimes as 
the only thing that philosophy can and should be, in proceeding from 
awareness of our continuing uncanny dependence on and transcendence 
of others. One can feel sometimes that here is a casual spiller of liquid col- 
ors and sometimes that here is the only genuinely human voice there is in 
philosophy, even in letters at all. The writing itself produces "that hesita- 
tion between the empirical and the supernatural on which the experience 
of the fanastic [hence of philosophy] depends" (p. 188). The effect 
remarkably resembles those that Cavell assigns to the Ancient Mariner's 
crossing the line into the polar regions, that is, into reaction against, dis- 
trust of, the conventional and acceptance of the uncanny and of hopes of 
rebirth. This passage into the polar regions, Cavell finds, makes the Mari- 
ner incomprehensible, self-absorbed, narcissistic, outside our ordinary 
language, and lonely (pp. 59, 60, 64). It can feel like this to pass into 
Cavell's writing; perhaps at times it feels like this to be Cavell. 
Passing into the acceptance of the uncanny, into detachment from the 
ordinary as it stands and into hope of rebirth within it, with all its continu- 
ing uncanniness-that is, following Cavell in his aversive exertions-has 
obvious stylistic risks. Cavell's writing can sometimes seem, as he pursues 
his interest in his own experiences of the uncanny and of the anxieties and 
hopes of recoveries, to alternate between triteness and sentimentality,8 on 
the one hand, and willful obscurity, on the other. Cavell himself is more or 
8 Michael Fischer, in his very useful survey focusing on Cavell as a Romantic writer and on the 
significance of Cavell's Romanticism for literary theory (Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism 
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989]), penetratingly notes the affinities between tradi- 
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less willing to go on suffering these reactions, as he continues, as he puts it, 
to "court the transcendental"' without quite claiming its possession. 
The stylistic risks of Cavell's aversiveness in courting but not claiming 
the transcendental themselves are the sign or surface of three internally 
related limitations, but also strengths, in Cavell's writing. Cavell's writing, 
far more than most traditional Romantic writing, is first of all markedly 
postreligious and Pelagian. It is as though he thinks that by the very 
aversiveness, unsettledness, and effort of his writing he could command 
his own audience and will both the return of the world and his own salva- 
tion. There is very little sense of original sin in Cavell's writing, very little 
sense of the need for grace and forgiveness. Though Cavell often writes 
about granting others their autonomy and foregoing the effort to possess 
them or their sensibilities, he seems less aware of what he may need from 
them and too ready to try to exert himself strenuously in writing to com- 
mand his own fate. The strength of this very limitation, however, is that it 
would be very hard to accuse Cavell of complacency in thought or prose. 
There is more onwardness to his writing than to that of any other contem- 
porary philosopher or theorist. 
Second, Cavell's writing is distinctly antinomian in its earnestness and in 
its refusals of doctrine. This antinomianism carries risks of inaccessibility, 
hermeticism, and uselessness. The writing seems to provide no ground for 
us to stand on. The countervailing strength here is that Cavell refuses the 
too-ready sureties of any social or metaphysical theory that might well, 
like any theory, issue in formulae of tyranny, as Plato saw in founding the 
state on the education of its legislators rather than on a constitution. We 
are not to suppose that a formula of value alone can save us. 
Third, in taking its departure from the experience of the uncanny, 
Cavell's writing is distinctly individualistic and in a way accommodationist 
to existing institutions. There is very little expression of concern for jus- 
tice or for how institutions may work to inhibit or promote it. Worrying 
about one's own experiences and recoveries threatens to leave everything 
in the public world as it is. It is no accident that Cavell has taken to describ- 
ing his interest in Emerson as an interest in urging a kind of individual 
moral perfectionism. But here, too, there is a countervailing strength. 
There is very little naivete in Cavell's writing about the complexities of 
the individual person. Theories of justice perforce abstract from these 
complexities and perhaps undervalue the capabilities of persons. Cavell is 
tional dismissals of Romantic writing and dismissals of Cavell's writing. "When readers dislike 
Cavell, they echo the complaints that Romantic literature has always generated, finding him self- 
indulgent, vague, anti-intellectual, and disorganized" (pp. 3-4). 
9 Cavell used this phrase in a discussion period following the presentation of some of his recent 
work on Emerson at a plenary session of the International Association for Philosophy and Litera- 
ture at Emory University, Atlanta, Ga., in May 1989. 
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in contrast ready to linger on just how endlessly divided against them- 
selves, anxious, hopeful, and interesting our, and his, individual expres- 
sions are. 
There is nothing like Cavell's attention to the complexities of the 
expression of our humanity, our uncanny dependence on and transcend- 
ence of others, in other pieces of writing and speech and in his own, any- 
where else in philosophical writing. Once we have a sense of what this 
attentiveness can yield, it is very hard, perhaps impossible, to settle for any 
more immediately accessible and useful, but more primitive, theory of the 
human and of justice. It is hence unclear whether there could be philo- 
sophical writing with the strengths of Cavell's in attending to our human 
complexity that was not Pelagian, antinomian, and individualistic. But it 
seems impossible now to honor any social or metaphysical theory that does 
not incorporate the complexly suspended readings of our condition and 
our expressions that Cavell has made available to us. How, one wonders, 
might we now go on? 
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